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Abstract  
The aim of this paper is to pin down the misuse of Heidegger’s philosophal insights 
within the discipline of artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics. In this paper we argue 
that a central thesis of phenomenology, in Husserl’s words, “putting the world be-
tween brackets”, has led to a positioning in embodied AI that deeply neglects funda-
mental representational aspects that are totally necessary for the purpose of building a 
theory of cognition. The unification of representational and being-in-the-world aspects, 
are necesary for the explanation and realization of complex consciousness phenome-
non in a cognizer, both animal and mechanic. The emphasis on the self (post-
cognitivists), on the being (phenomenologists), as well as the Being by Heidegger’s 
followers, has contributed interesting insights concerning the puzzle of cognition and 
consciousness. However, has neglected the necessity and even denied the possibility to 
provide a scientific theory of cognition.  
On the other hand, the phenomenologist’s separation of the world into two different 
ones, the scientific and objective world, and that of our common and lived experience 
is untenable. The claim that any scientific-theoretical world must find its foundation in 
the so called live world is ill-founded. In this paper we will propose the basis of a theo-
retical framework where only one world —with entities and processes— exists and can 
be known to a certain degree by the cognitive system. This calls for a unified vision of 
both ontology and epistemology.  
 
 
1 The Phenomenological Bias  
 
1.1 The object/subject problem revisited  
 
Phenomenology arose out the necessity to surmount the difficulties posed by 
the dichotomic vision established in Idealist and Materialist philosophies. 
Apparently, at the core of this dichotomic philosophical approach lurks a 
paradox pointed out by Husserl: “How is it possible that myself, as a tran-
scendental ego, builds-up the world, being at the same time a human ego in-
side the world ?”. But, where is the paradox? We can’t really see it.   
 
The agent is in the world and builds a world of its own, but there is no such  
paradox. Assuming that for a finite agent it is impossible to give a causal ex-
planation for every fact in the world this is not, in any case, due to a world’s 
opacity to the cognitive capabilites, but to the fact that we are limited cogni-
tive agents inserted in the same reality we want to know. We are part of the 
world and situated in it. Therefore we can perceive the world only partially. 
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The world we build and the world we live in are not identical, but closely 
bound by what Rosen’s called the modeling relation (1). This closeness being 
of evolutionary survival value.  
 
The phenomenologist’s approach is obviously excesively biased towards the 
experiencing agent. This bias has been inherited by robocists and other AI 
scholars as a reaction to the perceived failures of GOFAI (6). It has been used 
as a starting point for further development of common-sense centered theories 
and other naïve conceptions of peception and cognition.  
 
In Husserl’s philosophy (3) the object appears as essentially determined by the 
structure of thinking itself. The world is placed between brackets and the fo-
cus is put on the Cogito in the Cartesian’s Cogito ergo sum, and objectivity is 
not longer on the consciousness side.  
 
Husserl pretends to arrive at the essence of things from the experiencer1 point 
of view. To that end, phenomenology proposes a method called transcenden-
tal reduction (epoché) to get to the essence of the objects, hence bracketing the 
assumption of the existence of an external world. So, access to the real being of 
the things may only be achieved by the transcendental reduction process 
grounded in the experiencing self.  
 
The direct economic approach from engineering is necessarily closer to a 
Humean theory of the self. Hume rejects the object-subject dichotomy, elimi-
nating the self as a knower. Hume’s claim, unlike other empiricists like Locke 
or Berkeley, is in a sense more ontological than epistemological, because he 
does not have to posit the object of the knower, instead he just describes and 
analyzes a group of entities called perceptions. The self would be just that 
succession of related ideas and impressions (perceptions in Hume’s words) of 
which the agent has an intimate memory2. This interpretation of the self, as a 
connected succession of perceptions, will be taken afterwards by other 
authors (e.g. William James).  
 
1.2 Two kinds of beings for two kinds of worlds  
 
In Husserl’s philosophy, a distinction between the world and the everyday 
world (Lebenswelt) is established. This is a logical consequence of his tenets: if 
the cognitive agent is who rises the world depending on the agent’s attitude, 
the world could be configurated in a different manner.  
 
Here, there is an implicit criticism to the scientific method. In 
Husserl’s view, the scientific method would be just one attitude, valuable to 
understand the world explained by physics, but not the correct one to unveil 
the everyday world (Lebenswelt). This claim, that is, the inescapable distinction 
between the external reality and the reality perceived by the cognitive agent, 
                                                           
1 Then phenomenology becomes the discipline that investigates the essential nature of the 
world. 
2 If we eliminate, as Humes does, the epistemologic concept of knower, we do it too for the 
antinomy between unknown reality and known reality. Hume erases the trascendence in the 
cognitive agent, transcendence that by other means will be emphasized in Phenomenology, with 
the harmful consequences that will be shown next. 
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animal or robot, has been repeated as a totem by continental philosophers and 
some AI and roboticist scholars of postmodernist vein.  
 
We fully agree with the analysis that there are different attitudes and 
that we perceive things, categorize items or infer new sentences, in part moti-
vated and shaped by our current attitude. But the distinction of worlds as a 
consequence of the attitude, vanishes when we define the concepts in a rigor-
ous manner. Attitudes are structured frames or theories that can be eventually 
formalized, and might not be confounded with intentionality, which is, as 
Brentano pointed out, the focus of consciousness.  
 
Intentionality and attention are radically different things, the former is the 
power of minds to be about or to stand for things, and guiding the behavior, 
or said à la Dennett “an active engagement with the real world”; and the last 
is a more complex understanding of objects and process that frames the inten-
tionality of the cognitive agent.  
 
The question about the existence of two worlds —or two thousand 
worlds— appears promptly. This degeneration3 in the use of the word 
”worlds´´, is in part motivated by the mistake which considers thought and 
word as the same thing. Obviously language is an important high order cogni-
tive ability, whose fundamental function is to share mental states, that is, as a 
means to vehiculize, to make one’s thoughts public. However, inferring from 
that that there is an ontologic equivalence between mental concepts and the 
words that, denotate them, in order to make accessible to the linguistic level, 
is totally wrong4.  
 
The distinction between the world explained by the physics and the eve-
ryday world (Lebenswelt) does not correspond to any scientific reason but is a 
sign of obscurantist or at best, lazy thinking. The construction of the everyday 
world, different to the world of the physics, is not justified. There is only one 
world, whose entities and process are known to a certain degree, both to sci-
entists and cognitive agents. Our duty as scientists is to explain this world, its 
phenomenon and entities, by means of laws and causal theories either deter-
ministic or probabilistic or a mixture of both.  
 
2 Heideggerian AI. The being in the world  
 
Husserl’s program is indeed deeply epistemologic, but this is not the case for 
Heidegger, so keen to many post-modern roboticists. For Heidegger, Ontol-
ogy is possible only as a kind of Phenomenology. We can obtain the structures 
of the being only by means of the way they manifest themselves as phenome-
non. Heidegger’s is primordialy concerned with the pre-conceptual under-
standing of Being (Dassein) like a protoconsciousness, already socialized. But, 
explaining conciousness in terms of Dasein ignotum per ignotius.  
                                                           
3 Gerald Edelman (12) uses the same term -degenerate- to explain consciousness, “neural 
groups whose degenerate responses can, by selection accommodate the open-ended richness of 
environmental input, history, and individual variation”. 
4 The falsity of the ontological equivalence between thinking and speaking is easily 
demostrated: not all the concepts are linguistic concepts. This confussion was exemplary de-
scribed by the first Wittgenstein: ”the limits of my language mean the limits of my world´´. 
178 Gómez & Sanz - Journal of Mind Theory Vol. 0 No. 2 
 
Heideggerian philosophy rejects the apparent Cartesian isolation of 
the epistemological subject. There is never an isolated ”I” given without the 
world, rather any ontology is only conceived as the ontology of a subject. Be-
ing-in-theworld is the mode of being a cognitive agent immersed, not just in 
interactions, but in couplings with surrounding entities.  
 
This metaphysics differentiates two kinds of beings, the readiness-to-
hand and unreadiness-to-hand, the former is the being when we are using it 
and the second, when we contemplate it5. 
 
This analysis is fundamentally based in the perceptual and motor in-
teraction with equipments. The habitual example of the hammer, which has 
two different modes of being -a hammer hammering a nail, or a hammer in a 
drawer. This offers an extremely basic categorization (maybe that is the reason 
why it has some followers in AI) that is also extremely limited, because it is 
focused only on tools. It looks like Heidegger’s phobia of technology6 gives his 
system a kind of hand made or medieval touch in his philosophy.  
 
What this approach seems to provide, and to our understanding the 
central reason for its luring capability, is that it seems to offer an explanation 
for the apparent failure of GOFAI and a potential alternative to explore in the 
implementation of cognitive architectures. Agents, Heidegger’s followers say, 
do not need representation, but rather continuous sensory-motor immersion 
in its reality. The aphorism “the map is not the territory”(13) became the 
motto of the situated robotics movement7. This immersion in the world seem-
ingly offers a solution to the so called frame problem. If the agent uses the 
world as its own map it is no longer necessary to keep in sync the world and  
mental representation.  
 
The agent captures reality in the form of patterns (see Figure 2) or in the 
words of Agre these representations ”designate, not a particular object in the 
world, but rather a role that an object might play in a certain time-extended 
pattern of interaction between an agent and its environment´´(14).   
 
                                                           
5 Another Heideggerian, J.P. Sartre distinguishes between etre-en-soi and etre-pour-soi 
6 ”When man reveals that which presences, he merely responds to the call of unconcealment 
even when he contradicts it. Thus when man, investigating, observing, ensnares nature as an 
area of his own conceiving, he has already been claimed by a way of revealing that challenges 
him to approach nature as an object of research, until even the object disappears into the object-
lessness of standingreserve. Modern technology as an ordering revealing is, then, no merely 
human doing´´.(10) 
7 Curiously enough, some argue for this approach being non-externalist in the sense of Clark 
cognitive externalism. 
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Figure 1: The hammer, the nail and the stuff constitute a pattern.  
Of course, this Heideggerian conceptual system for beings is far too sim-
ple to give clear responses to other kind of concepts like the abstract or the 
simulated ones.  
 
The epistemic Husserlian program anticipates the frames theory devel-
oped by Minsky with his concept of Noema: a symbolic description of the 
anticipated features and values of an object, a sort of inner horizon of expecta-
tions that permit the structure of incoming data, conforming the context of the 
object. Heidegger criticizes this enterprise of determining the inner horizon as 
insufficeint to give an account of the context, because the necessary condition 
to determine it, is to consider as a whole the cultural practises. Therefore, the 
relevant characteristics which define the context are always already contextu-
alized in a cultural and historical background.  
 
Paraphrasing Heidegger we can say that ”[Agents] are already always in a 
situation”. But H.L. Dreyfus—a Berkeley professor and Heideggerian refer-
ence in the AI world— claims, in an opossing line, that a robot, even counting 
on all the possible knowledge it would get from the outside, would not be in 
any situation, the robot being a decontextualized entity 8.  
 
But the Heideggerian analysis of AI is useful in the sense that raises some 
critical issues concerning the kind of control architecture that a real-world 
cognitive agent should have —including the representational aspects they 
would abhor. This analysis does not exclude the possibility to formally de-
scribe the situation and hence derive representations for it. Heideggerians 
opposing representation-based architectures and modular structures go in-
                                                           
8 Heideggerian AI arises out from the frame problem. However it does not provide any solution 
to the problem, not even any useful insight; but it is a pernicious influence for AI and robotics. 
Indeed as Dreyfus points out, Heideggerian and positive theories are a contradictio in terminis. 
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deed too far in their analyses of the limitations. For example, their case for 
coupling vs input/output interactions seem to ignore the trivial fact that any 
interaction —whether input or output— is indeed bidirectional except in de-
generate cases, because the labeling input and output is plainly arbitrary and 
is in the eye of the beholder.  
 
The thesis defended in this paper is pretty far from this anthropomorphist 
view. We stress again, that the big mistake is in giving to the mental phe-
nomenon a condition of ontologic difference with respect to the external phe-
nomenon, driving the theorist to ascribe ascientific assumptions and intuition-
ist theories.  
 
One clear example of this is when Heidegger claims that the mental model 
of a human of the world is the world itself (cf Korzybski before). Were this the 
case, any two agents navigating the world would be similarly proficient. But it 
is obvious that humans, unlike robots or cockroaches, have a mental model of 
the world that is more acute —ideally isomorphic to a certain extent— that is 
good enough to permit the human race to survive. We can not say the same of 
the Heideggerian robots like Brooksian insects or of Cog, the failed humanoid. 
But we can say something about of cockroaches, their maximal survability 
being the reason for the mystifying power of bioinspiration, and it is that in a 
direct human-cockroach confrontation for an ecological niche all we know 
what would happen.  
 
Figure 2: The simple vision of the epistemic —model-based— control loop.  
It is a logical absurdity the claim that the mental model of the world of the 
cognitive agent is the external world; it can be suggestive as a poetic figure, 
but no scientific model or theory can accept an ontologic falsity as that as a 
valid proposition9. We claim that there is not any unsurmountable obstacle in 
formally defining a context for the everyday action. The focus must be put in 
                                                           
9 Heidegger here is totally coherent because Heidegger himself is ascientific. 
Gómez & Sanz - Journal of Mind Theory Vol. 0 No. 2  181 
the theory, which is operating as cache memory when we categorize or define 
concepts, we call this theory Legality. This is done in the context of the realiza-
tion of an epistemic control loop, where a model of the surrounding world is 
used by the agent in the performance of its dwelling (See Figure 2).  
 
3 The Embodied Cognition or the Being with Flesh  
 
All these efforts are very valuable but, from our systemic perspective, all these 
fleshists —Heidegger, Marleau-Ponty, van Gelder, Lakoff, Dreyfus, etc— put 
too much flesh in the dish of cognition.  
 
Marleau-Ponty (15) gives a sound account that supersedes the dichotomy 
subject(knower) --object(knowing), formulating the circularity in the percep-
tion-action loop. The animal is moved to action in order to acquire and main-
tain an optimal perceptual grip on what is significant to him in the world10; in 
other words, the body evolves in a pathway of permitted states defined by a 
net of basin of attractors ,which lead the body to move towards an optimal 
grip.  
 
The introduction by Marleau-Ponty of the body and the perception action 
loop in his cognitive theory is consistent with the naturalized studies of con-
sciousness, and has set the basis of embodied cognition theories, which are 
biologically inspired, where the mental phenomena are studied not as per-
sonal feelings but as a natural phenomenon. The body (coper) interacts with 
the environment in such a way as to cope with an environment organized in 
terms of that organism’s need to find its way around.  
 
So for Marleau-Ponty, the body is not just the physical space occupied by the 
thinking agent, but the necessary instrument to cope best coping with the 
environment, and to that end, the body moves towards its equilibrium. But 
once achieved, the coper can not stop there because the environment contin-
ues sending solicitations to be interpreted by the coper, in order to get a new 
best coupling or equilibrium between coper and environment. It is interesting 
to consider, at this point, the analysis done in neuroscience —and conse-
quently in neuro-inspired robotics— in terms of learning stimlus-response 
and action-outcome pairs. The question of causality lurks here and is strongly 
related with Merleau-Ponty’s concept of solicitation.  
 
Marleau-Ponty reduces or explains cognition based just on the perceptive 
process; it looks like the body is the magic key, which explains and obtains all 
the meanings. 11  
 
Van Gelder considers that the external world is too complex to possibly get a 
representation of it, and argues that it is cognition that enables the agent to 
cope successfully with the world.“The post-Cartesian agent manages to cope 
with the world without necessarily representing it. ...the internal operation of 
                                                           
10 This is also the central tennet of W.T. Powers perceptual control theory (16). 
11 Admitting the importance of mirror neurons discovery in motor verbs, we can not construct a 
global theory of knowledge just with bodily metaphors, flesh is not enough we need the bones, 
the skeleton! Maybe too much importance is given to the body(11). 
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a system interacting with an external world can be so subtle and complex as to 
defy description in representational terms, or in other words, cognition can 
transcend representation” (17). Obviously this is only true if representations 
are to be universal and not action-oriented. It is clear that representation com-
plexity can be reduced without much performance sacrifice for concrete tasks. 
The tradeoff between the complexity of the representation and the compe-
tence it offers is resolved in evolutionary economic terms.  
 
Even if van Gelder is using the term cognition in a wider sense as the act of 
knowing or, as an emergent property of the cognitive agent, representation 
can not be excluded from cognition, van Gelder eliminates the representa-
tional power of the agent in cognition, and puts in its place the notion of cou-
pling. Indeed coupled system performance —e.g. in terms of agent survival— 
is the result of an isomorphic representation of the world by the agent (more 
on this later). However, van Gelder suggests that cognition must be untangled 
from representation except for sophisticated cases involving representation 
such as breakdowns, problem solving, and abstract thought; but such phe-
nomenon are best understood as emerging from a dynamic substrate, rather 
than as constituting the basic level of cognitive performance”.  
 
But we think that the coupling part in the dynamic information processing, 
realized by the agent in a dynamic environment, is not the appropriate alter-
native to the representation of what the Heideggerians call “the everyday 
world”. Van Gelder is missing the point. There is not any justification to sepa-
rate cognition and representation, both are inherently informational processes 
or products of such processes; and on the other hand, when he points out that 
thinking an abstract thought is a phenomenon better understood as emergent, 
not only he is not not saying anything of any value about such a phenomenon 
but he is also suggesting a sort of emergentist inexplicablity.  
 
No matter what the emergent properties are, they must occur following laws, 
as do all the other phenomena happening in the world12. Denial of this is 
pure obscurantism, an attitude incompatible with the scientific stance.  
 
4 A proposal: Systemic-Explanation  
 
When we observe a Heideggerian robot trying to avoid a non trivial obstacle 
(see for example (20)) we certainly know that this is not what we see from an 
animal not much more sophisticated than an insect or what we would expect 
from the machines of the future. Higher animals do have cognitive capabilities 
that surpass what the ready-to-hand and present-at-hand ontologies make possi-
ble. Deep representations and representation-based behavior engines lie at the 
core of this capability. For us, something is a representation of another some-
thing if it contains/captures some aspect of this second something.  
 
In a sense, the whole issue of anti-representationism seems absurd from our 
perspective. What a sensor does is re-present in a different value space the 
                                                           
12 It is quite probable that the so called emergent phenomena is just massive non-linearity, to be 
explained in the future using thoeries like nonlinear thermodynamics, chaos theory, etc. 
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value of a certain magnitude. So, from this perspective, if there is a sensor 
there is a representation. Elephants don’t play chess but they necessarily re-
present the light in the sky, the water that they drink or the sound of their 
youngsters.  
 
Beyond the concreteness and atomicity of such representations, can you imag-
ine going back home by means of being-in-the-world?. That would take time, 
too much time indeed for an evolutionarily viable system.  
 
The impression that we get from the Heideggerians is that they see represen-
tation in the simplest GOFAI sense of collections of atomic predicates. Obvi-
ously this representation is untenable as a substrate for cognitive behavior in a 
world for the simple reason that these representations can not represent rele-
vant aspects of the world; fundamentally those related with dynamical-
structural aspects of the world.  
 
Heideggerians realize this fact and their reaction is the rejection of the repre-
sentation as such —and its associated sense of separation between agent and 
world— to embrace a holistic approach: the agent can’t be separated from the 
world and it must be its own representation. What they should reject is not 
representation but the kind of representation that is not effective for the par-
ticular class of world that the agent in interacting with.  
 
Systems theorists describe systems as a collection of things and a relation be-
tween them:  
 
S = (T, R) 
 
In the system we are interested in, the things T included by the agent and its 
surrounding reality. Heideggerians aptly see that a collection of representa-
tions of the states of the things is not enough to capture the dynamics of the 
agent-world system. But they fail when they revert into strictly focusing just 
into the relational aspects R. There is no system without the relation and there 
is no system without the things. Both parts are necessary to understand the 
dynamics and hence necessary to master to make a living in that context. 
While centered on social studies, the article of Mario Bunge (8) is extremely 
clarifying in this aspect.  
 
So, what a perfect cognitive system must do is to perfectly represent the whole 
system S = (T, R) in its mind in order to maximize its performance. Obviously, 
perfection in representation is not possible (this is van Gelder’s argument) but 
thank God it is not necessary for a real agent. What an agent actually needs is 
a sufficiently good representation of S —we call this a model— to get a suffi-
ciently good outcome from its use. Fortunately, simpler models can be qualita-
tively equivalent to detailed ones in a certain region of their state space. This 
is what makes driving cars on roads possible, or the use of computers without 
being a computer scientist, or what enables cooking without being an histolo-
gist, a chemical engineer and perception psychologist at the same time.  
 
Quoting Edward Box we can say “Essentially, all models are wrong, 
but some are useful”. Cognitive agents just exploit useful models. But having 
a model is not a question of contingency but of necessity. There is no alterna-
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tive other than internalizing a model to be effective. As Conant and Ashby 
demonstrate (19) every good regulator must contain a model of the system it 
is controlling, or, put into the words of cognitive science, the agent must rep-
resent the world to dwell in it. This has strong implications: if an agent is suc-
cessful in a certain world, it is because it is driven by a model of that world.  
 
This does not mean that we can open the agent and read in its mind, the struc-
ture of the world —reading the model– because the model can be collapsed 
with the perceptual or behavioral systems or with both (see figure 
fig:epistemic). For example the hammering model of Figure 2 can be collapsed 
with behavioral subsystem so a hammering order will directly map into the 
motor action of the agent for a concrete hammer, a particular type of nail and 
a class of stuff to nail the nail into. These embodied realizations of the ham-
mering agent are less effective for a different hammer, different nail or a dif-
ferent stuff —the things— for for a different grasp or static friction coefficient 
of —the relations. But a non-embodied, cognitive agent, can appropriately 
reason in those circumstances.  
 
We may then question what is the adaptive value of embodiment. The answer 
is clear and well known in engineering: there are tradeoffs that define families 
of control structures for the available niches; speed vs cost, robustness vs vari-
ety, size vs growth, etc. Embodiment is just an economic, effective solution for 
certain operational niches.  
 
But we shall remember the fact that embodiment sacrifices behavioral flexibil-
ity and that in conditions of no restrictions the pure disembodied agent is 
maximally performant.  
 
We may wonder what the theoretical substrate is, that enables the construc-
tion and exploitation of effective model-based representations. The deep in-
sight is that models do have morphic relations with the modeled. This means 
that entailments in the modeled —e.g. causal entailments in a physical sys-
tem— can be mapped into logical entailments in the model, and logical en-
tailments in the model can be mapped back to the modeled system. So we can 
use the model to reason about the modeled —e.g. to drive part of the world to 
a certain state or to get some qualia for the agent.  
 
This relation between systems (Figure 4) is called the modeling relation by 
Rosen (1) and to our understanding captures the very nature of cognition: 
minds can be put into congruence with the world.  
 
5 Conclusions  
 
Trying to overcome Descartes, the Phenomenologists —from Husserl to Va-
rela passing through Heidegger— have proposed something worse than the 
Cartesianism, the invention of transcendental entities hardly justifiable in the 
modern scientific paradigm to give substance to an impoverished relational 
model of the system composed by an agent and its environment. What 
Husserl calls the Ego, Heidegger calls the Dassein; these are more or less sug-
gestive metaphors or rhetorical pictures insufficient in obtaining a scientific 
representation of the mental state.  
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We must strive to find the general conditions of possibility for the mental phe 
nomenon. Naturalizing minds up to the level of consciousness is a long term 
project but scientifically falsable, technically sound and in any case better than 
the simple option of the phenomenologists.  
 
Figure 3: The Rosen’s modelling relation captures the basic tenets of cognition as 
model-based interaction with the world.  
Anti-reductionism is usually mislead, and the distinction between ontologic 
and epistemic reductionism must be known. The first is a reductionism of 
type ”A is B”, being A and B predicates (i.e: A neural process is a mental proc-
ess), and the later is ”B is explained in terms of A” (i.e: In a depressive state 
the concentration of serotonine is low).  
 
The nature is structured in levels, the postulation of the Dassein is a conse-
quence of the incapability to appreciate this fact. The everyday world is the 
same world of the books of physics. Indeed Newtonian mechanics can be 
written in Einstein equations. It is a question of granularity (norms and theo-
ries, the legality in Petitot terms) and not of non- measurability or a-
representability. Models do not only have resolution levels but qualitatively 
hierarchical morphisms. The external world exists independently of the sub-
ject and the real processes and entities belonging to the world can be de-
scribed and explained objectively. On the opposite side of this view are those 
who claim that there only exist, the appareances perceived by the subject; but 
even the extreme phenomenist take for granted the reality, independently of 
what he is observing, he assumes the reality of what he is observing and also 
the reality and of himself as an observer of the phenomenon. In conclusion, it 
is impossible to avoid being a realist and it is nonsense to be an anti-
representationinst. This is how we-are-in-the-world.  
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